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A B S T R A C TThere is increasing evidence that the social value of an incremental
health gain depends on patient characteristics, such as their age and
their prognosis. This article presents an analytical framework to illus-
trate how a disease splits our life expectancy into 1) past health (age), 2)
prognosis untreated, 3) gain from treatment, and 4) incurable loss. A
Norwegian population sample was asked to make pairwise choices and
prioritize hypothetical patients who differed in terms of age (30, 50, and
70 years old), remaining lifetime without treatment (1, 3, and 10 years),
and increase in remaining lifetimewith treatment (1 month, 3 months, 1see front matter Copyright & 2013, International S
r Inc.
1016/j.jval.2013.06.002
olsen@uit.no.
ondence to: Jan Abel Olsen, ISM, University of Tromyear, and 3 years). Their preferences reveal strong support for the “fair
innings” argument that total lifetime inequalities should be reduced.
Differences in patients’ remaining lifetime without treatment did not
matter, implying little support for the “end-of-life” argument that a short
life expectancy makes patients entitled to preferential treatment.
Keywords: priority preferences, “end of life,” “fair innings.”
Copyright & 2013, International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and
Outcomes Research (ISPOR). Published by Elsevier Inc.Introduction
Policy documents and guidelines in many countries suggest that
differences in patients’ age and prognosis should be taken into
account when setting priorities. UK guidelines suggest preferential
treatments for patients with a short remaining life expectancy,
commonly referred to as “end-of-life” treatments [1]. In New
Zealand and Norway, the emphasis is on the size of health losses
[2,3], which implicitly means prioritizing young patients. In The
Netherlands, a decision-making framework has been developed that
takes into account both the remaining life expectancy and the health
loss [4]. These policy objectives imply that decision makers accept
higher costs per unit of health gain for treatments of diseases that
involve short remaining life expectancies and/or large losses of life.
There is increasing empirical evidence that people prefer
decision makers to take differences in patients’ age and prog-
noses into account [5]. Different methodologies have been
applied when attempting to elicit such preferences [6,7]. By use
of an ordinal ranking technique, Dolan and Tsuchiya [8] com-
pared the relative importance of age versus future health pros-
pects and concluded that differences in age were most important.
A recent exploratory study on how people value a life-
extending gain showed that the majority of respondents chose
to treat the patient who was closest to his or her expected death
[9]. We cannot, however, tell whether these preferences for
reducing inequalities in prospective lifetime would have “survived”
if age differences were included in the scenarios.
To prioritize the patient who is closest to death can be
explained by a concern for the “worst-off.” A contrasting criterionis the “fair innings” view that every individual is entitled to
achieve the lifespan that he or she had reason to expect [10]. Note
that the fair innings criterion disregards any differences in
patients’ proximity to death, while the end-of-life criterion
disregards any differences in patients’ age.
The aim of this article was to explore people’s support for
these two contrasting criteria in health care priority setting: Does
fair innings trump the end-of-life criterion?; that is, do people
think that it is more important to reduce inequalities in total
lifetime than in prospective lifetime?Analytical Framework
Figure 1 illustrates the effects of a disease that strikes at age TA: the
individual’s life expectancy (LE) is reduced from TLE to TP. There are
four relevant lifetime quanta, the ﬁrst of which is the past health to
the left of TA, indicating current age. At TA, the remaining health
without new treatment is the prognosis untreated, with the asso-
ciated remaining lifetime untreated (TP – TA). The availability of
effective interventions yields gain from treatment, with the asso-
ciated increased remaining lifetime (TG – TP). Finally, there is the
incurable loss due to disease and its associated life expectancy loss
(TLE – TG), which becomes a residual. Clearly, if a completely
effective treatment were available, there is no incurable loss.
Any disease can be illustrated within this framework, as long
as we know patients’ age, their prognosis untreated, and their
expected gain from treatment. The current survey explores
whether respondents value a given lifetime gain (TG – TP)ociety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
sø, 9019 Tromsø, Norway.
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Fig. 1 – The effect of a disease on life expectancy.
V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 6 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 1 0 6 3 – 1 0 6 61064depending on the differences in remaining lifetime untreated
(TP – TA) and/or depending on the total lifetime untreated (TP).
The former reﬂects support for the end-of-life argument, while
the latter reﬂects support for the fair innings argument. Further-
more, the survey reveals any support for a criterion that seeks to
amalgamate these two arguments, that is, the “proportional
shortfall” criterion (suggested in The Netherlands [4]), which is
concerned with the relative loss in remaining life expectancy
caused by the disease (TLE – TP)/(TLE – TA).Methods
The study design includes a series of pairwise choices bet-
ween different combinations of attribute levels. Acknowledging
that respondents have limited cognitive capacity to digest
information of this kind, each choice set was presented in three
stages (see Appendix in Supplemental Materials found at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jval.2013.06.002): a ﬁrst “scene setting”
screen contained age and remaining lifetime without treatment
in “two typical patients from two different patient groups.” The
second screen added a row for the increased remaining lifetime
with treatment, as well as a row in which respondents wereC1
V1
TA 50 50 3
TP - TA 10 3 1
TG - TP 3 1
Relative support within each 
choice
59% 41% 9
Equal priority if the gain (TG - TP) 
to the not preferred patient were:
3
V2
TA 50 50 3
TP - TA 3 1
TG - TP 3/12 1/12 3
Relative support within each 
choice
63% 37% 8
Equal priority if the gain (TG - TP) 
to the not preferred patient were:
3/12
V3
TA 30 70 3
TP - TA 10 3 1
TG - TP 3 1
Relative support within each 
choice
95% 5% 7
Equal priority if the gain (TG - TP) 
to the not preferred patient were:
5
Fig. 2 – Study design and results. Subjects were randomly assign
choice sets, C1 to C4 (shaded). Under each choice set in each versi
opting for the two alternatives within each choice, and the med
that would make the two patients have equal priority.asked to tick which patient they thought health care decision
makers should prioritize.
The third screen included an empty box, in which they were
asked to ﬁll in how much increased lifetime the not pre-
ferred patient in the second screen would have to gain to make
the two patients have equal priority. Hence, their ordinal choi-
ce in the second screen determined which of the two
patient columns in the third screen had an open space
where their indifference number should be inserted (see the
precise wording in Appendix in Supplemental Materials found
at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jval.2013.06.002).
Each respondent was presented with four choice sets in which
two patients differed across two or all three attributes. To include
choice sets with more numerical combinations, and to test for
ordering effects, respondents were randomly assigned to one of
three questionnaire versions. Figure 2 illustrates the survey
design, with choice sets shaded.
Version one (V1) opened with a choice set (C1) with identical age
in both patients, followed by threefold differences in remaining
lifetime untreated and lifetime gains. (In C1, the remaining lifetime
difference is actually not precisely threefold, but 10/3). Consistent
with the end-of-life argument, it was hypothesized that the major-
ity would prioritize the patient with the shortest remaining lifetime
untreated. In the two subsequent choice sets, age differences were
introduced to test whether respondents turn to prioritize the
younger patient, reﬂecting preference for reducing total lifetime
inequalities rather than reducing prospective lifetime inequalities.
Version two (V2) intended to test whether preferences
are sensitive to the absolute levels of remaining lifetime and
gains, using the same relative differences as V1 in C1 to C3.
Version three (V3) included two choice sets with identical gains to
test whether people prefer to reduce total lifetime inequalities
even with a 10-fold difference in remaining lifetime untreated.
Ordering effects were explored by having an identical choice set
appear in different order (C4 in V1 vs. C1 in V2; C3 in V1 vs. C1 in
V3; C4 in V2 vs. C2 in V3).C2 C3 C4
0 50 30 70 50 50
0 3 10 3 3 1
3 1 3 1 3/12 1/12
1% 9% 94% 6% 71% 29%
5 5 3
0 50 30 70 30 70
3 1 3 1 10 1
/12 1/12 3/12 1/12 1 1
1% 19% 90% 10% 54% 46%
4/12 12/12 1
0 70 50 70 50 70
0 1 10 1 3 3
1 1 1 1 1/12 3/12
0% 30% 71% 29% 54% 46%
3 3 5/12
ed to versions V1, V2, or V3, where they faced four pairwise
on, results are shown in terms of distribution of respondents
ian respondent’s required gain for the not preferred patient
Table 2 – Summary of results.
Choice of
principles
Comparisons Findings
V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 6 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 1 0 6 3 – 1 0 6 6 1065After the four choice sets, respondents were asked what was
most important when answering these questions. The survey
was conducted online by TNS Gallup in November 2010. We
requested a sample of 500 respondents to be representative of the
Norwegian adult population.“End of life”
vs. gains?
C1 in V1 (P o 0.001) Strong majority
support for gains
over short
remaining life
C4 in V1 (P o 0.001) Median indifference
gain for the short
remaining life
identical to that for
the long remaining
life; i.e., the median
respondent ignores
differences in
remaining lifetime.
C1 in V2 (P o 0.001)
One sample t tests
C2 in V3 (P o 0.001)
C3 in V3 (P o 0.001)
One sample t tests
“End of life”
vs. “fair
innings”
C4 in V2 (P o 0.001) Strong majority for
reducing total
lifetime inequalities
despite a 10-fold
difference in
remaining lifetime
untreated; i.e., “fair
innings” trumps
“end of life.”
C2 in V3 (P o 0.001)
C3 in V3 (P o 0.001)
One sample t tests
“Fair innings”
vs. gains?
C4 in V3 (P o 0.001) Majority support for
the young even
with a threefold
difference in gains
One sample t testsResults
The 503 participants are representative with respect to gender
and age distribution. Like most surveys of this kind, respondents
with tertiary education are overrepresented (see Table 1).
Included in Figure 2 are the results on the relative support for
each of the two patients within each choice set, and the median
value of the gain required in the not prioritized patient that would
make the two patients have equal priority. Key ﬁndings are
summarized in Table 2.
In the choices between threefold differences in remaining
lifetime untreated versus threefold differences in gains (C1 in V1
and V2), the majority would prioritize the patient with the
highest gain rather than the shortest remaining lifetime. Intro-
ducing age differences (in C2, C3) made signiﬁcant shifts toward
the relatively younger patient groups.
In the comparisons between different absolute levels, but same
relative differences, there were no statistically signiﬁcant differ-
ences in two of the three comparisons (C1 in V1 vs. C1 in V2 and
C3 in V1 vs. C3 in V2). Ordering effects were present in one of
three comparisons (C4 in V2 vs. C2 in V3). With identical gains, in
the choice between end of life versus total life, there is clear
majority for reducing total lifetime inequalities despite a 10-fold
difference in proximity to death (C4 in V2; C2 and C3 in V3); that
is, fair innings trumps the end-of-life argument.
The lack of support for the proportional shortfall criterion can
be inferred from C4 in V2 and C2 and C3 in V3: What matters was
not the relative loss, but the absolute loss.
The trade-offs between end of life versus gains (C1 in V1 and
V2, C4 in V1) gave median indifference values identical to the
higher gain alternative (marginal rate of substitution, MRS ¼ 1);
that is, the median respondent was completely neutral to any
differences in remaining lifetime untreated.
The trade-offs between end of life versus age gave median
indifference values of gains in two choice sets (C2 and C3 in V3)
that were three times higher for the oldest patient group (MRS ¼
3). In other words, a 10-fold difference in remaining lifetime
untreated was not sufﬁcient to prioritize the older patient with
the shortest proximity to death—a further threefold difference in
gains was also required. Hence, these trade-off exercises conﬁrm
that people are more concerned about total lifetime inequalities
than prospective lifetime inequalities.
After completing the four choice sets, respondents were asked
what had been most important to them when answering
(Table 3). Their answers appear consistent with their preferences
as revealed from the choice sets: Only 12% said that remaining
lifetime untreated had been most important. Age, which wasTable 1 – Respondent characteristics.
Characteristic Sample
(n ¼ 503)
Norwegian
norm
Age group 20–29 y 17% 20%
Age group 30–49 y 46% 44%
Age group 50–70 y 37% 36%
Sex, male 52% 53%
College/university
education
57% 37%considered most important, showed different relative support
across versions. Interestingly, the relative importance of age
corresponds consistently with the number of choice sets that
had contained age differences: V1 had two, V2 had three, while
V3 contained four choice sets with age differences. No wonder
therefore that respondents having faced more age differences
stated that this had been important to them.Discussion
Based on an increasing number of empirical studies, it has
become clear that the value to the public of a health gain depends
inter alia on patients’ age and their prognosis untreated. An
important ﬁnding is that the majority would prioritize the young,
even with a 10-fold difference in remaining lifetime. Respondents
were signiﬁcantly more concerned about reducing inequalities in
total lifetime than they were in reducing inequalities in prospective
lifetime.
The median respondent disregarded differences in remaining
lifetime without treatment. The only thing that matters is the
size of the gain. Interestingly, National Institute for Health and
Clinical Excellence guidelines deﬁne end-of-life treatments as
those targeted on patients with remaining life expectancy less
than 2 years [1]. Our ﬁnding gives no support to health policy
initiatives that will prioritize patients on the ground of a short
remaining life.
No matter which methodology is being used for eliciting
priority preferences, answers are sensitive to unexpected framing
issues. There are a number of methodological lessons and
psychometric issues to explore further. A potential age bias in
the chosen design (the ﬁrst piece of information presented) might
be reduced if age numbers were presented after the gains and
proximity to death numbers. Furthermore, a visual aid based on
Figure 1 might assist with the meaning of the numerical values.
Table 3 – “What was most important to you when answering these questions?”
V1 (%) V2 (%) V3 (%) Total (%)
Differences in lifetime gains 31.3 21.6 13.3 22.4
Differences in remaining lifetime without treatment 12.8 10.2 11.4 11.5
Differences in age 41.9 53.3 61.4 51.8
Somewhat random 9.5 10.2 7.0 8.9
None of the above 4.5 4.8 7.0 5.4
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 6 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 1 0 6 3 – 1 0 6 61066These results are preliminary in that they are based on small
samples and few numerical combinations. The attempt at having
respondents state their indifference value (MRS) in the third
screen of the choice set, after having been familiarized with the
exercise in the previous two screens, represents a promising
approach to a cognitively demanding task.
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